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1.  Introduction 
 From a distance, say on Google Earth, the mountainous landscape of the archipelago 
would seem to make Japan an inhospitable place for golf.  The familiar statistic of the 
uncultivable 80% of the land mass suggests that real estate might be better turned to other, 
less profligate uses.  Closer up, however, many cities are ringed with the tell-tale worm 
castings of fairways, bunkers and greens.  In the countryside, the bucolic vista of paddies 
climbing into the hills, abutting the woods that, if not primeval, still reassure about the 
Japanese ability to coexist with nature, is rudely interrupted.  Decapitated hills and shaven 
slopes announce the presence of a course, which is more often then not brown, despite the 
chemicals required to maintain the pretense of the green carpet (midori no jūtan) that is 
thought to be the object of desire.  At ground level, suburban landscapes are punctuated with 
the tall nets of driving ranges, city centres by equipment emporia, membership exchanges and 
even golf bars, while bookshops and station kiosks are festooned by the tell-tale green and 
now pink of golf-related publications. 
 Similarly, the waves of demand for the discretionary golf goods of courses, ranges 
and equipment that swept through Japan in the postwar period might seem to be at odds with 
the producer-oriented GNPism that provides the basso ostinato of many accounts.  We know, 
of course, that the latter is a little too simple.  Urbanization in the early modern period and 
industrialization in the early 20th century had long established habits of consumption, albeit 
hedged about with ecological, geo-political and other constraints, which placed a premium on 
discrimination and refinement, producing the cultivation of a somewhat obsessive practice 
well-suited to the frustrations of golf.  Panning in past the iron triangle that has been seen to 
structure the postwar political economy reveals the myriad of local actors, whose individual 
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decisions to invest in ventures not sanctioned by MITI, to spend rather than save, may have 
provided the surplus with which to drive the creation of a middle mass habit. 
 Might golf, then, also provide a counter-point to the corporatist line composed for our 
standard accounts of postwar growth?  To cut to the chase, probably not.  Both in terms of 
supply and demand, the drivers for the explosion in golf course development, practise and 
play in postwar Japan seem to have been corporate.  In contrast to the prewar period, when 
golf was sustained by private membership clubs, postwar golf was provided and consumed 
for the most part by companies, who built the courses, bought the memberships and 
mandated that executives and aspiring middle managers should learn to play the game.  
Together with an interesting set of externalities (financial speculation, yakuza involvement, 
membership scandals, labour disputes and environmentalist critique), this produced a very 
strange kind of pastime: exhausted salarymen might leave the house at 6 on a Sunday to trek 
out to the countryside, where they would spend the day wining and dining, more than hitting, 
establishing and re-establishing the corporate hierarchies and business networks through 
which the work of the week might be done.  Entertaining in any society has its protocols, 
which raises problems for an account of consumption premised on the individual choices of 
free agents; but settai gorufu in Japan seems to have been an extremely prescribed kind of 
demand, a rather productivist, if highly conspicuous kind of consumerism: if you built it, you 
could almost guarantee that they would come, either because they already worked for the 
company that owned it and paid for their membership, or because the proximity of the club to 
a major population centre and/or the prestige of its designer and members could ensure that it 
would become an object for speculation on the relevant, sky-rocketing exchange. 
 This kind of golf, however, had its limits.  Investment continued into the early 90s, 
the majority of the clubs have survived, and it is still common to break after the first nine 
holes for a long, carb-heavy, alcohol-saturated lunch.  But the model for golf has begun to 
change.  It is clear that both the business case for course development and the social demand 
for golf à la Japonaise was unsustainable.  In the wake of the bursting of the bubble, the 
distressed asset of Japanese golf became a prime target for new players: Goldman Sachs and 
others swept in during the fire sale, creating portfolios with which to cultivate a new kind of 
demand.  Together with the industry more broadly (equipment manufacturers, designers, 
publishers and the rest), the new owners and brokers are targeting a new consumer and 
creating a new golf: family-friendly, young at heart and often female.  The individuality that 
is the stock in trade of the virtual memberships and leisure advertising directed toward this 
audience might suggest that Japan too, finally, is acknowledging the economic potential of 
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consumer demand.  Up to a point.  As is clear to anyone who spends an hour or so navigating 
the baroque complexity of booking systems, the technophilic prose of a golf magazine or the 
glacial play of a Japanese foursome, golf, however changed, remains an unlikely place to find 
the free radical of liberal fantasy.   
Or perhaps, golf might be one place to rethink how and why consumers do demand.  
In what follows, through a brief history of how golf has been consumed in and beyond the 
archipelago by Japanese people over the last century or so, I want to suggest both why we 
need the Japanese consumer, if not necessarily Japanese golf, in our accounts of Japan’s 
modern history but also how Japanese golf can reveal the way in which consumption is 
always more complicated than our transparent language of and clear distinctions between 
demanding subjects and desired objects might suggest. 
 
 
2. Prelude 
 Golf did not emerge ex nihilo from the ashes of defeat.  While prewar golf was a 
minority interest at best and its history is more often than not an occasion for antiquarian 
debates about who came first, it is nonetheless significant for the story of golf as consumer 
good, inasmuch as prewar clubs and golfers established both the local rules by which golf 
was played in Japan and the hierarchy of value that continues to determine the golfing 
economy today.  At this point, it is not clear when and where the former—female caddies, 
breaking for lunch, et al.—first came into being, but it is still prewar courses—Hirono, 
Hodogaya et al—that comprise the majority of the meimon among golf cognoscenti and that 
have retained their value in the last two decades, even as bubble-era late-comers have seen 
their value and reputation collapse.  Koganei Country Club, established in 1937, has 
notoriously long been the most expensive club in Japan and still demands a seven-US-figure 
joining fee.1 
 The first golf in Japan, however, was expatriate, a by-product of the trading profit and 
lifestyle aspirations of the foreigner communities in Kobe, Yokohama and beyond.  Kobe 
Golf Club was formed in 1903 on top of Mt. Rokko, using land purchased as a way of 
summering away from the muggy port below.  Negishi followed three years later, making do 
with the land in the middle of the Yokohama race course and allowing for the development of 
another dimension to the inter-port rivalry.  Unzen, in 1912, was an initiative on the part of 
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the local government rather than foreigners, but again targeted at the latter as a summer 
resort, not least for those seeking to escape the heat of Shanghai.2  These early courses 
allowed space for the development of a particular kind of sociality, which did not exclude the 
Japanese.  There were seven Japanese among the founding members of the Kobe Golf Club, 
including two Matsukatas, a Sumitomo and the head of the Kobe tax office.  None of them 
played, however: the club was useful as a place to network with locally prominent 
foreigners.3  This function of the club, absent the foreigners, would continue to remain at the 
core of the demand for golf in Japan, but in the first decade of the twentieth century, there 
was little Japanese demand for golf. 
 It was not until 1914 that the first indigenous sprouts were visible, with the creation of 
the Tokyo Golf Club.  The cultivators were telling.  Inoue Junnosuke, then President of the 
Yokohama Specie Bank and soon to be head of the Bank of Japan, had played a bit of golf 
while studying in England, like many of those who found themselves sent to America and 
Europe during the Meiji period.  He wasn’t a golfing enthusiast, but understood its value for 
rest, recreation and networking.  With 30 founding members, including a Saionji and Iwasaki 
Koyata, he was able to raise the capital to lease a site in Setagaya, newly accessible through 
the Tamagawa railway.  The characteristic combination of public figures, private capital and 
informal networks inaugurated the playing of golf in Japan.  The importance of the last was 
evident in the number of non-playing members, which prompted the introduction of green 
fees for those among the membership who chose to use the course itself, in addition to their 
initiation fee and annual dues.  Soon enough, the practice had spread.  Karuizawa had been 
developed in the 1880s and saw its first nine holes in 1921.  At the same time, a tussle with 
the landlords at the Tokyo club had produced a search for an alternate site, which resulted in 
a move to Komazawa but also the creation of a second club, Hodogaya, in 1922.  One year 
later, golf went imperial.  Hirohito had watched golf during his visit to the UK in 1921, had 
played a couple of times at Komazawa later in the year and played the Prince of Wales when 
Edward visited Japan the following year, albeit not with much success.  In 1923, a 9-hole 
course was opened in Shinjuku Gyōen for the exclusive use of the imperial family.4 
 Following its most venerated chronicler, the prewar history of Japanese golf falls 
easily into a number of periods.5  The first expatriate and the second inaugural were followed 
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3 Kubota, 20.  Lockyer, forthcoming. 
4 Mowa, 31-70.  Tanaka, 75-76. 
5 Mowa 
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by a third, which took the story up to 1929, and a fourth, which carried the enthusiasm for 
golf past the depression and the invasion of Manchuria.  The third was marked officially by 
the creation of the Japan Golf Association in 1924, acknowledging a certain critical mass of 
courses and golfers, which demanded and might sustain a coordinating infrastructure, nation-
wide competitions and the like, but also exploiting an increasing media interest in the sport. 
The latter was catalyzed by Akaboshi Rokurō, who would quickly become the leading 
celebrity of the prewar scene, but was then in the US.  Having attended prep school and 
Princeton, in the spring of 1924, he won a tournament at Pinehurst.  The potential of golf as 
media event was soon evident.  The Osaka Mainichi was quick to organize the Japanese 
professional championship, from its second year in 1927, although they might have preferred 
to sponsor the first Japanese Open, in the same year at Hodogaya, where Akaboshi 
triumphed, beating a number of pros in the field.6  Nor did the enthusiasm ebb in the wake of 
the economic crisis or the invasion of Manchuria.  For decorum’s sake, presumably, Hirohito 
had to keep his swinging in-house, on a practice course inside the palace grounds, but golf, 
like much of life, continued to thrive during the 1930s.  1933 saw the beginning of the 
domination of the Japanese Amateur Championship by the newly-married Marquis 
Nabeshima Naoyasu and the first golf exhibition at Mitsukoshi in Nihonbashi, 1935 the 
inauguration of the All-Japan student championship and 1937 the establishment of the 
Koganei Country Club with a lay-out by Walter Hagan, as well as a well-publicized visit to 
Japan in October by Gene Sarazen, two of the three dominant US players of the time.  Hagan 
would play an exhibition match at Koganei the following April.7   
 There was interest in and demand for golf, therefore, throughout the prewar period. 
But the interest seems to have been limited to and golf remained something played almost 
exclusively by the elite.  Golf occasionally appears in the visual culture of the day: a panel 
depicting an iridescent course and elegantly attired golfers by Yamaguchi Hōshun in a 1928 
handscroll illustrating contemporary customs and mores (Gendai fūzoku emaki) might be 
evidence that golf was one element the modern life to which one was meant to aspire.  But 
the strange placement of the golfers suggests that the painter did not himself play the game 
and, as Kubota Seiichi has noted, however, the absence of golf in prewar books about sport 
indicates that it was at least seen as a different kind of pastime.8  The suggestion is born out 
by the statistics.  In 1940, there were only 71 courses and some 110,000 golfers in Japan, 
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8 Kubota, 15. 
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comprising 0.8% of the population.  The extent to which golf remained an aristocratic 
monopoly was suggested by a recent genealogy published by Choice, the most upmarket of 
the many golf magazines, which sketched a Konoe-centred network incorporating most of the 
golfing great and good from the prewar years.  By the same token, golf was an object of 
desire for a newer elite, the club a place where alliances might be forged and support assured.  
Golf was therefore a private affair, not yet a consumer good. 
 For the same reason, perhaps, golf was vulnerable as Japan turned to war  
and recovered from its effects, so ripe for investment and reinvention in the second half of the 
century.  Golf was a particular target as the country was mobilized for war in the late 30s and 
early 40s, given its elite status and foreign origins, evident not least in the katakana with 
which the game had to be played.  The authorities made various attempts to indigenize things, 
renaming balls, clubs and the sport itself with Chinese characters in an attempt to coat what 
was clearly beyond the pale with a veneer of East Asian respectability.  Golf enthusiasm 
persisted and golf was played throughout the war.  Golfers, however, were targeted and had 
to resort to subterfuge, sending clubs ahead and dressing down in an attempt to reach the 
course unmolested.  Golf courses, too, proved tempting for the Japanese authorities simply as 
land, while the resources needed to maintain them as such were seen to be better deployed for 
other uses.  By the last years of the war, even golf magazines were beyond the pale.  The 
oldest such publication, which had started life in 1922 as Hanshin Gorufu, had 
prophylactically changed its name to Nippon Gorufudomu in 1933 and had been rechristened 
again under military pressure at the beginning of the Pacific War as Nippon dakyū, was 
forced to cease publication in February 1944. 
 The problems continued during the Occupation.  Americans were eager to play golf 
during their sojourn, commandeering the remaining courses and demanding that their 
Japanese staff provide the material wherewithal to play the game.  Their enthusiasm 
suggested one possible use for golf as the Occupation came to an end.  In 1951, a Mr. 
Hirayama, writing in Kankō (Tourism) magazine, noted that there had been some 50 courses 
before the war, but noted that there were only 12 left, with another 3 under construction, but 
only 4 could be used by the Japanese.  His statistics may not have been entirely accurate.  The 
USGA in 1957 suggested that only 18 had survived of 62, while more recent accounts have 
revised both figures upwards.  In any case, as Hirayama pointed out, the current supply was 
inadequate to meet even the existing domestic demand.  But his purpose in writing was to 
suggest how golf might also comprise a key ingredient in the development of a tourist 
industry with which to resuscitate the Japanese economy.  It wasn’t enough simply to give 
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foreigners something to look at, one also needed to provide things to do: hunting, shooting, 
golf.  Twenty years ago, Hirayama noted, when golf was booming in the US, there were 13 
golfers born every minute.9  Hirayama was looking in the wrong direction, however.  As in 
the US, the demand, when it came, would be home-grown.  And while it may not have 
outpaced the American miracle simply in quantitative terms, given the respective populations 
of continent and archipelago, its effects, given the constraints of the landscape, were striking. 
 
 
3.  Boom 
 As with the prewar, so the postwar enthusiasm for golf in Japan can be seen to have 
come in several waves, the first of which came in the late 50s.  Already by 1957, there had 
been some improvement since the dire situation at the end of the Occupation, with some 118 
courses and some 300,000 golfers, increases of 66% and 172% over their respective figures 
for 1940, who played a total of 1.8 million rounds of golf during the year.  The USGA, 
commenting on the nascent Japanese scene, emphasized the pent-up demand produced by the 
rapid increase in the number of golfers, with some 5,000 taking up the sport every month.  
Nearly every club, it noted, had a membership of 1,000, with some topping 2,000, and most 
had barred visitors at weekends.  Five years later, it might have been encouraged to note, the 
landscape had been transformed, with some 295 courses, which saw nearly 7.4 million 
rounds.  1961 alone had seen an additional 68 courses and 1.4 million rounds.   
The usual reason trotted out for this first boom is the Canada Cup, which was held in 
Japan for the first time in 1957, was televised and saw Nakamura Torakichi win both the 
individual and team competitions.  Nakamura became the first postwar golf celebrity, his 
rivalry with Hayashi Torakichi providing fodder for the media, before passing the baton to 
the first of a number of ‘big threes’.  The Canada Cup may indeed have proved inspiration for 
some, not least Miki Tokuchika, then building up the organization of Perfect Liberty Kyōdan, 
whose gospel included the power of golf as a medium of self-expression and which was also 
busy in 1957 building what would become Seikyo Country Club next to its headquarters in 
Tondabayashi, Osaka.  Despite the media coverage, however, the clear potential, not least for 
spiritual growth, and the astonishing numbers, golf in the 50s and 60s still seems to have 
been pastime for a privileged class.  By the middle of the latter decade, it was clear to 
ambitious salarymen that they needed to work on their swing if they were to aspire to the 
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executive suite.  In 1964, Life captured the serried ranks of white-singleted office workers 
practising at a flood-lit three-story driving range, presumably somewhere in the Tokyo 
suburbs. But there would be an enduring distinction between using a range and playing a 
course.  At least anecdotally, the latter privilege seems to have been restricted to the top three 
in most companies.  While the numbers suggest that there must have been a few rounds 
played by people other than executives, the fact that golf had not yet been taken up as grist to 
the mill of the emerging manga industry might support the impression that it remained a 
minority, if no longer entirely elite interest.10 
 Change was in the air, however.  1964 saw the Tokyo Olympics and the wide-scale 
adoption of colour tv, 1967 the broadcasting of the ‘Big Three in Japan’ by TBS, Arnold 
Palmer, Jack Nicklaus and Gary Player demonstrating just how good one could look on the 
green carpet of the golf course.  The following year, the inauguration of the Japan Women’s 
Open introduced a new factor into the media equation.  Women remained the main attraction 
of golf on tv for the next few years, until the emergence of the out-sized figure of Jumbo 
Ozaki in the early 70s, and a useful source of revenue for much longer, though not yet as 
consumers themselves.  Golf Digest’s World Ladies Golf Calendar was produced for the first 
time in 1975.  The photographs of foreign female pros in mini-skirts seem to have excited 
enough demand for the proceeds to have paid for a new building for the company and remain 
in demand today.  The previous year had also seen the publication of the first golf-themed 
manga in a general-interest magazine (Puro gorufā Saru in Shōnen Sandē).  But there 
remained a gap between the various aspirations of viewers and readers, as encouraged and 
relected on screen and page, and the material fact of building courses and swinging clubs.11 
By the end of the 60s, there were more reasons to do the latter.  The accumulating 
profits of Japanese companies needed investment, the shift away from older industries 
demanded that land be turned to new uses.  Reminiscing in 2008 with Shima Kōsaku, the 
manga phenomenon whose own 25-year ascent to company president was at least smoothed 
if not enabled by his golf prowess, Aso Tarō recalled his own experience as head of Aso 
Cement converting mines to golf courses.  (Neither the conversation or the company history 
published at the time mentioned the wartime forced labour that continues to haunt what is 
now the Aso Iizuka Golf Club.)  By the 1970s, a tipping point had been reached.  For one 
interviewee, working in Osaka, the Expo saw the beginning of a shift, from golf as a 
monopoly of the company executives to something played by middle management.  The 
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numbers support the contention of a rapid expansion in the playing population and, perhaps 
therefore, in the number of courses.  The 1960s had continued the steady growth of the first 
boom, with an increase of some 1.5 million rounds a year, but the early 70s saw a sudden 
spike, taking the total rounds from 20.5 million in 1970 to 41.7 in 1975.  Courses soon 
followed, with over 100 new courses built every year from 1973 to 1976, taking the total 
number from 773 to 1,228.12 
Not all of the demand for golf can have been corporate.  There was a general shift in 
the 1970s away from older uses for the countryside, such as hunting, to the newer hobby of 
golf.  But the supply was calibrated to meet a corporate demand, producing a particular kind 
of course and a particular kind of golf.  As for the former, courses were not designed to 
challenge the pro, but to flatter the executive hacker with a 24 handicap.  To do so meant 
crafting holes that were difficult to par, but easy to birdie, so raising the possibility that even 
the company president might play to if not beyond his potential: putting bunkers within 
driving distance, therefore, was a no go, whatever the club professional might have wanted.  
The golf itself, after all, was only one part of a complete package.  Everyone arrived at the 
same time, played at the same time and had lunch together.  Coordinating the whole 
operation took some doing, inasmuch as only four golfers could tee off on the first or the 
tenth at any one time.  But the day was facilitated by female company, carrying the bags 
around the course and bringing the food and drink in the restaurant.  The impression was only 
heightened by the grandeur of the clubhouse, by a famous architect if possible, such that the 
amount of time spent on the day was offset by the exclusivity of the surroundings.  In other 
words, this was settai gorufu, golf as corporate entertainment, where a membership at a club, 
more often than not owned by one’s company and close-ish to one’s work, was part of the 
remuneration package and where playing the game was subsidiary to the corporate bonds and 
business relationships that were thereby strengthened.13  Golf, perhaps, was the counterpart of 
the company training long ago identified by Tom Rohlen and others as central to the creation 
of the white-collar class: work and play were both disciplined, corporate concerns. 
 The boom in the 1970s, however, was only a small indication of what was to come.  
The numbers of courses and users continued to tick upwards in the late 70s and early 80s.  By 
1983 there were just under 1,500 courses in Japan, seeing some 63 million rounds a year.  
Then things got out of hand.  In part, what followed was simply a story of surplus capital 
seeking decent returns.  The supply was such that much of it washed up overseas, flooding 
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13 Interviews, November and December 2007. 
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prestige properties such as Turnberry and Pebble Beach, but perhaps nowhere more strikingly 
as in Hawaii, where at one point every course on Maui was Japanese-owned.  In Japan itself, 
however, irrational investment became outright speculation, underpinned by Nakasone’s 
post-Plaza attempts to prop up the economy, most significantly in the form of the notorious 
Resort Law.  Low-interest rates, government funds, land privatization and weakened 
regulations prompted a flood of investment into shady ventures, not least by local 
governments and criminal syndicates.  Takeshita’s subsequent attempt to revivify the rural 
economy with a 100 million yen grant to all local authorities only exacerbated the lemming-
like stampede.  By 1989, there were over 1,700 courses in Japan, with another 325 under 
construction and 983 in their planning stages, together with 4,790 ranges, which would 
increase to nearly 6,000 the following year.  Golf courses alone had become a trillion dollar 
industry in 1988.  One year later, courses and ranges were a market worth some 1.663 trillion 
yen, to which the golf equipment industry added another 237 billion.  It was no surprise that 
by this point golf was also a prime target for environmentalist critique, which accused the 
courses of destroying the archipelago.14   
 Supply was part of the story, therefore, but it was overwhelmed by demand.  Apart 
from 1983 and 1985, the courses saw an increase of over 5% per annum in the total rounds 
played throughout the 1980s.  In 1989, this amounted to almost 90 million rounds a year, 
added to which were the 135 million individual uses of the driving ranges.  Practising on the 
range was the seventh most popular leisure activity in the country, playing on a course the 
fifteenth.  Nearly 26% of men were habitués of the range (23% of a course) and 34% (31%) 
of those in their 30s and 40s.  But golf still lead all others as the sport which men wanted to 
take up.15  The ravening hordes enabled all kinds of excess.  Just as golf course development 
had invited infusions of unaccountable capital, so golf club membership became a target for 
speculation.  It was no surprise that the Nikkei should have created an index of membership 
prices, nor that it should have seen a nearly eight-fold increase between 1982 and 1990.  The 
aggregate concealed all kinds of variation, of course.  At the top end, a club like Aqualine, an 
hour southeast of Tokyo, could charge nearly $135,000 as a joining fee, while still under 
construction.  The objective was to have as few members and to be as luxurious as possible.  
(It was no wonder that memberships and even rounds soon became a useful bait with which 
to tempt politicians and bureaucrats and so a leitmotif of political scandals from Recruit to 
the present.)  The pre-sale tactic was a general one, but elsewhere, the strategy was to 
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maximize the return by selling as many memberships as possible.  The problems that arose 
from such a system had been evident from the 1960s, but by the late 1980s, the situation was 
out of hand.  In some places, clubs had over 20,000 members, meaning that it was almost 
impossible for most to play the course.  At Gatsubi GC in Shizuoka, things got so bad that the 
disgruntled members formed an association to protect their rights.16 
 The numbers alone suggest that by the end of the 80s, golf had spread beyond the 
corporation to become an object of desire more generally.  Golf manga became 
commonplace, holding out the possibility that even an overweight junior-high-school student 
from the wrong side of the tracks might end up beating Nicklaus in the Open at St Andrews, 
albeit in volume 58 (Ashita tenki ni na are, 1981-92).  Meanwhile, the late Chūsonji Yutsuko 
created the oyaji gyaru, the ball-busting, take-no-prisoners OL, whose resistance to office 
norms were signaled in her free-wheeling adoption of the obsessive habits of her male 
superiors, including smoking, drinking and, not least, golf (Suīto supotto, 1989-92).  Despite 
the popular culture dreams, however, the average consumer remained a salaryman: 39 years 
old, with an income of 6.1 million yen, a wife and a child, and an allowance of 50,000 yen a 
month, almost all of which went on the 1.5 rounds and 4 practices at the range that he 
allowed himself per month.17  More generally, the extent to which demand outpaced supply 
meant that even if golf could be consumed at various price points (none of them reasonable 
by international comparison), there was little incentive to change the product itself--or indeed 
to provide a public alternative.  There were only 27 public courses out of the 1,722 total in 
1990.  Golf remained the privatized, corporatized product that had emerged over the previous 
eight decades, a very prescribed kind of consumption, with female caddies, mandatory 
lunches and largely male patrons. 
 
4.  Bust 
 And then the wheels came off.  The broad narrative is a familiar one, given what we 
know of the lost last two decades.  Already in 1990, there was a slight downtick, with 
400,000 fewer rounds and 1.1 million fewer practices than the year before.  The following 
year saw perhaps the most notorious revelation of the shifting sands on which the whole 
edifice had been constructed.  The company behind Ibaraki Country Club had pre-sold 
memberships, promising to limit the total to 2,830 (still a bloated roll by the standards of 
many clubs elsewhere in the world).  In fact, however, the developer sold over 52,000 
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memberships, channeling the 100 billion yen thus acquired to associated companies.  The 
course was never completed, the company went bankrupt and the main defendant was given 
11 years and fined 700 million yen for his troubles, a fair exchange perhaps for a take of 
nearly 15 billion and having avoided nearly 6 billion in tax.18  Despite the warning signs, it 
took some time for the house of cards to collapse fully.  The Nikkei index had halved by 
1992, as the collapse in the property market brought the speculative trade in memberships to 
a grinding halt, but for most of the 90s, golf club bankruptcies hovered in the single figures, 
with total liabilities running under 5 billion yen.  Then, at the end of the decade, the problem 
exploded, with 27 bankruptcies in 1999, 25 in 2000, 57 in 2001 and 98 in 2002, the last year 
seeing liabilities of over 30 billion yen.  The problems continued through the rest of the 
decade.  In 2005, there were 71 bankruptcies, with over 14 billion yen in liabilities, while 
even in 2009, there were 26 bankruptcies, though total liabilities had again subsided to under 
5 billion yen, meaning that fully 33.6% of the then 2,356 courses in Japan were in 
administration.19  Given the over-supply, it was no surprise that construction too ground to a 
halt.  2007 saw the opening of the first new golf course in Japan for nearly a decade.  
 The trail of destruction, however, proved fertile ground both for new players and new 
ways of playing the game.  It was American vultures that were the first to take the initiative, 
Ripplewood Holdings swooping early in the new millennium to buy out the hubristic Seagaia 
resort in Kyushu, following its acquisitions of a bank and the record label known for its 
catalogue of enka.20  It was soon overtaken by slightly more established, though no less 
ravenous beasts.  By the end of the decade the two largest portfolios were held by Goldman 
Sachs, operating as Accordia, and Lone Star, a Texas-based investment firm, operating as 
Pacific Golf Management.  Both saw past the highly leveraged position of many bubble-era 
courses to the positive cash-flow, averaging $1 million a year, that most were generating.  
Buying the debt at a nominal price put them in a position to negotiate with the various stake-
holders, repaying the banks some 20 to 30 cents on the dollar and the long-suffering members 
only 2.5 percent of their investment.  Not everyone was happy and many chose to walk away.  
The Nikkei began to creep upwards again from the middle of the decade, but remained less 
                                                
18 Tanaka, 142. 
19 Tsubaki gorufu, http://www.mmjp.or.jp/tubaki-golf/newsfail/1news.html and 
http://www.mmjp.or.jp/tubaki-golf/newsfail/2010/0421-hoteki-zennkoku.html. 
20 ‘Foreign invaders’, Time, 11 March 2002. 
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than 10% of its 1990 peak toward the end of the decade.21  But for those who chose to 
remain, the new owners also began to provide a new kind of product. 
 At Aqualine, even in the mid-90s, when the writing should have been on the wall, 
having paid one’s $135,000 joining fee, one was expected to submit to the familiar rigmarole 
of corporate golf.  “We didn't realize that there is an alternative to everyone arriving at the 
same time, playing at the same time and having lunch together.”  Following Goldman’s 
purchase of the club in 2005, course maintenance and food have both improved, while the 
cost of a round for non-members has halved.  Most important, perhaps, you can start to play 
more or less when you want, you don’t have to stop for lunch and you don’t have to hire a 
caddy.  You can even drive a cart onto the fairway.  It has become conceivable if not always 
achievable for a round of golf to take less than an entire day.22  It is not only the Americans, 
however, who have understood the potential for changing the game.  Golf Digest Online 
(GDO), an offshoot of Japan’s largest golf-related publisher, has also got into the business of 
making golf accessible to a larger audience, by acting as an intermediary between a huge 
number of clubs and an increasing number of customers.  Its rationale for doing so points to 
older scruples that may still govern the consumption of golf: for the club, to admit their 
eagerness to cater to visitors would be to damage their special relationship with the existing 
membership; for the visitor, to call a club directly and to be asked if one is a member is to 
risk awkwardness.  For both sides, the ability to bypass the niceties of tatemae, together with 
the discretion and assurances provided by an admittedly virtual membership, is a good 
solution, as well as a nice earner for GDO itself.23  The technology through which it operates, 
the number of courses to which it can provide access, together with the range of other goods 
available online also suggest a new consumer-orientation in the world of Japanese golf. 
 Such an orientation is essential for the golf industry, no less than any other sector, if it 
is to sustain the demand for its various products in the face of declining discretionary 
incomes and ongoing demographic decline.  It is not enough to cater to the traditional male 
market, particularly given the well-documented cost-cutting by most companies and the 
anecdotal unwillingness of many younger employees to give up their weekends to play an 
interminable round with the colleagues with whom they spend the rest of the week.  Courses, 
manufacturers and publishers are searching for new markets, promoting younger role-models 
                                                
21 ‘U.S. Firm's Deft Play Helps Japanese Golf Out of Rough’, Washington Post, 15 June 
2008. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Interview, March 2008. 
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like Ishikawa Ryō, the ‘bashful Prince’, emphasizing the family-friendly fun to be had at 
made-over resorts and above all targeting women.  While 22.4% of men already played golf 
in 2000, suggesting market saturation given international comparisons, only 5.4% of women 
had picked up a club.  And so the last few years have seen a wave of initiatives and 
publications inviting women to play the game.  The serried ranks of green-jacketed course 
guides, technical manuals and the like that mark the well-populated golf section in most 
bookstores are now complemented by a small but growing number of introductory guides, 
more often than not bound in pink.  Many golf magazines have a redisu senyō kōnā, most 
fashion magazines carry regular golf-related features, while Regina leads the pack of golf 
magazines targeted explicitly at women.  Some of these include at least some emphasis on 
playing the game.  Elsewhere, performance and turnout are emphasized as part of the 
requisite repertoire of a professional young woman.  More often than not, however, golf is 
merely an excuse for other kinds of consumption, above all of fashion, but also food, travel 
and perhaps even love.  Equipment as accessory, course as backdrop, golf becomes another 
stage on which to craft the cute quasi-cosmopolitan self at home in the commodified world.  
As Regina memorably put it, when describing the joys of ‘romantic golf in Hawaii’, ‘no love, 
no golf, no life’. 
 
5.  Inconclusion 
 What does all this say about consumption and everyday life?  (What else needs to be 
said about the everyday consumption of golf?)  Golf of course cannot be perceived as a staple, 
like sugar or rice, however much the needs for these might have been manufactured during 
the process of modernization.  Golf is not a necessity, like clothing or medicine, although the 
transformation of the former into fashion and the commodification of the latter suggests a 
common mechanism that also worked to promote the practice of golf.  Nor is golf part of the 
material infrastructure—of rail, mail, and long-distance retail—through which the modern 
consumer came into being.  Golf is discretionary at best, more likely marginal to the grand 
narrative of Japanese consumption. 
 But golf is also telling, albeit of a story that may already be quite familiar.  Golf in 
Japan seems to have been consumed not so much for the joy of playing the game, although an 
extensive literature on the epiphanic experience of a well-struck long iron might argue 
otherwise; rather, playing the game provided and provides access to a particular kind of 
space—for speculation, interaction and performance—through which to fashion an 
appropriate self.  This space for much of the last century was of course the club rather than 
Lockyer, Golf   
Draft.  Please do not cite or circulate without permission. 
15 
the course, the pantomime exertions on the course counterbalanced by the well-heeled ease of 
the nineteenth hole to provide a convincing stage for the sophisticated man of leisure.  As 
such, golf in Japan underpins Daniel Miller’s argument for a turn away from the liberal 
emphasis on individual choice to a Hegelian acknowledgment of the interaction between 
consuming subject and consumed object subsequent to the moment of choosing.24  What is 
striking in Japan, perhaps, is the limited nature of the choices that were available for much of 
the twentieth century.  If you wanted to play golf, you had to be a member, you had to pay a 
lot, you had to stop for lunch and you had to use a caddy.  That model proved unsustainable 
and more recently the choices have seemed to multiply, but it still seems hard to claim that 
golf is any less prescribed.  The complexities of online booking, the necessity for the latest 
clubs and kit, the reiteration of rules and etiquette and the torrent of technical advice (about 
everything from swing to slope, stretching to diet) all make it quite clear that there is a right 
way to play the game.  Meanwhile the female caddies who continue to help and applaud 
customers, as they navigate the virtual fairways of golf bars in downtown Tokyo, suggest that 
it will take some time for older habits to die.25  To suggest that the Japanese consumer 
historically has had little say to say in how he or she might play golf is not necessarily to 
revert to a productivist account of political economy, much less a Maruyaman indictiment of 
missing subjectivity, but it does point to the way in which a crowded island and corporatist 
growth has left little room for the awkwardness, which some would say should characterize 
the game. 
                                                
24 Miller, 1987. 
25 ‘Get into golf’s virtual swing’, Japan Times, 25 June 2008. 
